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Abstract. In recent years, opinion dynamics has received an increasing
attention, and various models have been introduced and evaluated mainly by
simulation. In this study, we introduce and study a dynamical model inspired
by the so-called “bounded confidence” approach where voters engaged in an
electoral decision with two options are influenced by individuals sharing an
opinion similar to their own. This model allows one to capture salient features
of the evolution of opinions and results in final clusters of voters. The model
is nonlinear and discontinuous. We provide a detailed study of the model,
including a complete classification of fixed points of the appearing dynamical
system and analysis of their stability. It is shown that any trajectory tends to
a fixed point. The model highlights that the final electoral outcome depends
on the level of interaction in the society, besides the initial opinion of each
individual, so that a strongly interconnected society can reverse the electoral
outcome as compared to a society with looser exchange.
Introduction
Studies on opinion dynamics aim to describe the processes by which opin-
ions develop and take form in social systems, and research in this field goes
back to the early fifties [8, 12]. In opinion studies, the word “consensus”
refers to the agreement among individuals of a society towards a common
view, a concept relevant to diverse endeavors of societal, commercial, and
political interest. Consensus in opinion dynamics has been the object of sev-
eral contributions such as [11, 24, 25, 29, 4, 5, 17]. A commonplace of these
studies is that public opinion often evolves to a state in which one opinion
predominates, but complete consensus is seldom achieved. Some basic mod-
els to describe opinion dynamics are described in the recent monographs [28]
and [22].
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Most models in opinion dynamics are linear. One of the first nonlinear
models was analyzed in [20, 19], where the notion of “bounded confidence”
was also introduced. Bounded confidence concepts were further developed in
[14, 6], while other nonlinear models based on similar approaches were studied
in [9, 10]. In 2002, Hegselmann and Krause [15] published an interesting
study about an opinion model with bounded confidence, later called the
Hegselmann – Krause (HK) model, and provided computer simulations to
illustrate the behavior of this model. In the same publication, they also noted
that “rigorous analytical results are difficult to obtain.” After that, the HK
model and its generalizations attracted a significant deal of attention, see,
e.g., [7, 27, 21, 1, 23, 3, 2, 18, 30, 31, 13]. In particular, some theoretical
results on sufficient conditions of convergence valid for a wide class of models
of continuous opinion dynamics based on averaging (including the HK model
and some models studied by Weisbuch and Deffuant) were obtained in [26].
The paper [16] extends the HK model by also including leaders and radical
groups and derives various interesting behaviors resulting from this extension.
In this paper, we are especially interested in the dynamics of voters which
have to choose between two alternatives. In this context, a natural assump-
tion is that voters are more influenced by individuals sharing a similar opin-
ion, which, when taken to its extreme, leads to models with bounded con-
fidence. We discuss in more detail this aspect below after introducing the
model. We contend that this situation leads to fixed points in the dynamics
that correspond to the formation of opinion clusters. We study analyti-
cally these fixed points also analyze their stability properties. Although the
present study refers to a simplified model, it is able to unveil and explain at a
theoretical level fundamental features which have been observed in practice.
While the model is described in detail in the next section, for explanation
purposes we feel advisable to introduce here certain salient features of it. A
population is formed by N individuals, also called “agents.” The agents’
opinion in regard of an electoral question with two options (identified by the
numbers −1 and 1) is described by vk ∈ [−1, 1], k = 1, . . . , N , where a value
close to −1 means that the individual k carries an opinion more in favor of
the option −1, while the opposite holds with a value vk close to 1. Opinions
vk evolve in discrete time through interaction. At any point in time, the new
opinion of agent k is formed by taking into account the opinions of agents
whose values vl are not too distant from vk (bounded confidence). More
precisely, fix a number ǫ > 0 (not necessarily a small number) and denote by
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J(vk) the set of indices l of agents with opinions ε-close to vk, i.e.
J(vk) = {l ∈ {1, . . . , N} : |vl − vk| ≤ ε}.
The new opinion of agent k is obtained by adding to vk a value proportional to
the average of opinions vl over the set J(vk) and “cutting” the new value if it
exceeds the boundaries of the interval [−1, 1] (for a precise description, refer
to the next section). It turns out that, apart from special configurations that
give unstable equilibria, this dynamics leads to final configurations where the
population splits in two clusters, having values −1 and 1. When taking the
average to compute the value by which vk is updated, the value of agent k is
included in the calculation as well. In the extreme case where an agent has
no other ε-close agents, this implies that this agent reinforces her/his belief:
in absence of counter-arguments, one tends to strengthen her/his own initial
opinion; in general, one’s opinion is compared with the opinion of others in
a neighborhood to determine the evolution.
In the proposed model, an agent is only influenced by agents who are
having a similar idea. This modeling assumption only holds in first approx-
imation as agents may also interact with others that think quite differently
and get influenced by them. Hence, this model only captures the predomi-
nant elements in a social interaction, while it neglects various second-order
aspects. We also note that assuming that agents are “deaf” to others thinking
differently is getting more realistic as the world evolves towards interaction
schemes based on social media and the web where the contacts and sources
of information are selected by the users.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, the mathematical
definition of the model is given. Section 2 is devoted to the behavior of the
dynamical system generated by the model: we describe fixed points, study
their stability, and show that any positive trajectory tends to a fixed point.
Numerical examples are finally presented in Section 3. These examples show
interesting features, for example, that the level of interaction influences the
opinions in the long run to the point that the predominance of one option over
the other can be reverted depending on the interaction level in the society.
1. Definition of the opinion model
The opinion of N agents is described by a finite array
V = (vk ∈ [−1, 1] : k = 1, . . . , N),
where vk has to be interpreted as the level of appreciation of agent k for
one among two options: a value vk close to −1 means that agent k has a
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preference for option −1, and the closer vk to −1, the stronger the preference;
the opposite holds for option 1. Denote by V = [−1, 1]N the set of such arrays.
We fix two numbers h, ε ∈ (0, 1). In addition, we fix two functions, a(v, w)
and i(v) (called affinity and influence function, respectively).
In this study, the function a(·, ·) is defined as follows:
a(v, w) = 1 if |v − w| ≤ ε and a(v, w) = 0 otherwise.
If a(vk, vl) = 1, we sometimes say that “vk is influenced by vl.”
The function i(·) is defined simply as follows:
i(v) = v. (1)
For k = 1, . . . , N , denote by J(vk) the set of indices l ∈ [1, N ] (here and
below, we denote by [a, b] the set of indices {a, . . . , b}) such that |vl−vk| ≤ ε
and by I(vk) the cardinality of the set J(vk).
We study the dynamics on V defined by the following operator Φ. First
we fix a V ∈ V and consider the auxiliary array
W (V ) = (w1(V ), . . . , wN(V ))
defined as follows
wk(V ) = vk + h
N∑
l=1
i(vl)a(vk, vl)
I(vk)
, k = 1, . . . , N.
Sometimes, when this does not lead to confusion, we writeW (V ) = (w1, . . . , wN)
instead of W (V ) = (w1(V ), . . . , wN(V )).
Due to (1),
wk(V ) = vk +
h
I(vk)
∑
l∈J(vk)
vl. (2)
After that, we define
Φ(V ) = (v′1, . . . , v
′
N)
by “cutting” the elements of W (V ) according to the rule
v′k = −1 if wk < −1, v
′
k = 1 if wk > 1,
and
v′k = wk if |wk| ≤ 1.
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Obviously,
Φ(V) ⊆ V.
Note that if we replace in (2) vl by vl − vk and take h = 1, then we get
the HK model.
Our main goal is to study fixed points of the operator Φ and their stability.
2. Dynamics of the opinion model
We start with an initial array V = V 0 with the following property:
v01 ≤ · · · ≤ v
0
N .
Of course, we have a lot of ways to “numerate” members of our group
(for example, alphabetically). Since the set J(vk) depends not on indices of
elements of V but on their values, it follows from formula (2) that Φ(V ) is,
in a sense, independent of numeration. In our case, an ordering reflecting
the initial preferences of the agents seems to be the most convenient.
Let
V n = Φn(V 0) = (vn1 , . . . , v
n
N).
First let us note some important properties of the operator Φ.
We need a simple technical statement (for its proof, see, for example,
item (i) of Lemma 2 in [19]).
Lemma 1. If
x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn ≤ y1 ≤ · · · ≤ ym,
then
x1 + · · ·+ xn
n
≤
x1 + · · ·+ xn + y1 + · · ·+ ym
n+m
≤
y1 + · · ·+ ym
m
.
Take a sequence V = (v1, . . . , vN) such that
v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vN
and consider the “increments”
∆k = wk(V )− vk.
Lemma 2. The following inequalities hold:
∆k+1 ≥ ∆k, k = 1, . . . , N. (3)
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Proof. Let J(vk) = [a, a+ l] with va ≤ · · · ≤ va+l and J(vk+1) = [b, b+m]
with vb ≤ · · · ≤ vb+m. By formula (2),
∆k = h
va + · · ·+ va+l
l + 1
and
∆k+1 = h
vb + · · ·+ vb+m
m+ 1
.
If J(vk) ∩ J(vk+1) = ∅ (which is equivalent to the inequality a + l < b),
then (3) obviously holds.
Otherwise, let J(vk) ∩ J(vk+1) = [b, a+ l]; it follows from Lemma 1 that
va + · · ·+ va+l
l + 1
≤
vb + · · ·+ va+l
a + l − b+ 1
≤
vb + · · ·+ vb+m
m+ 1
,
which completes the proof.
The following statements are more or less obvious but since we use them
many times, we formulate them separately.
Applying induction on n based on Lemma 2, the following properties of
V n = Φn(V 0) can easily be established.
Corollary 1.
(a) Every array V n is nondecreasing;
(b) If vnk = 1, then v
n
l = 1 for l > k;
(c) If vnk = 1, then v
m
k = 1 for m > n.
We do not explicitly formulate obvious analogs of items (b) and (c) for
vnk = −1.
Let us explain a step of the induction in proving item (a) when we pass
from n = 0 to n = 1 (the other steps are similar). Inequalities (3) for
∆k = wk(V
0) − v0k and the nondecreasing property of V
0 imply that the
W (V 0) is nondecreasing; hence, V 1 is nondecreasing as well.
(b) follows from (a).
(c) If v0k = 1, then v
0
k is not influenced by negative v
0
l (since ε < 1); hence,
w1kgeq1 and v
1
k = 1.
We next move to the study of fixed points of Φ. Recall that P ∈ V is a
fixed point of Φ if Φ(P ) = P .
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First, we mention a class of fixed points which is important for us (as we
show below, almost all positive trajectories of Φ tend to such fixed points).
Let P = (−1,−1, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , 1), where the first L entries equal −1 while
the remaining equal 1. We do not exclude the cases of P = (−1, . . . ,−1) (in
which L = N) and P = (1, . . . , 1) (in which we formally set L = 0). Any
such P is a fixed point of Φ. This follows from item (c) of Corollary 1 (and
its analog for vnk = −1).
Let us call any such P = (−1,−1, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , 1) a basic fixed point of
Φ. We are going to show that any basic fixed point is asymptotically stable
for Φ (see Theorem 1).
Let us start with a simple statement which we often use below.
Lemma 3. If v0k ≥ ε, then there exists an n0 ≥ 0 such that v
n
k = 1 for
n ≥ n0.
Proof. The condition v0k ≥ ε implies that v
0
k is not influenced by negative
v0l . On the other hand, k ∈ J(vk), so that
wk(V
0) ≥ v0k +
h
N
v0k ≥ ε
(
1 +
h
N
)
.
If wk(V
0) ≥ 1, then v1k = 1, and our statement follows from item (c) of
Corollary 1. Otherwise,
wk(V
1) ≥ ε
(
1 +
h
N
)
+
hε
N
(
1 +
h
N
)
> ε
(
1 +
2h
N
)
,
and so on, which obviously implies our statement.
The same reasoning shows that if v0k ≤ −ε, then there exists an n0 ≥ 0
such that vnk = −1 for n ≥ n0.
Introduce the following metric on V: if
V = (v1, . . . , vN) and V
′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
N),
set
ρ(V, V ′) = max
1≤k≤N
|vk − v
′
k|.
Theorem 1. Let P be a basic fixed point. If
ρ(V 0, P ) ≤ 1− ε, (4)
then there exists an n0 such that
Φn(V 0) = P for n ≥ n0. (5)
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Proof. Let V 0 = (v01 , . . . , v
0
N) satisfy inequality (4). Then
|v0k| ≥ ε, k = 1, . . . , N,
and our theorem follows from Lemma 3 since the number of components of
V 0 is finite.
Remark 1. One can establish the convergence to basic fixed points
under weaker conditions than (4). Assume, for example, that
v01 ≤ · · · ≤ v
0
L < 0 < v
0
L+1 ≤ · · · ≤ v
0
N
and
v0L+1 − v
0
L > ε.
Then the same reasoning as in Lemma 3 shows that Φn(V 0) = P for some
finite n, where P is a basic point.
There exist fixed points that are not basic; we show below that they are
unstable. A simple example of such a fixed point is as follows. Let N = 3;
clearly, P = (p1, p2, p3) = (−1, 0, 1) is a fixed point of Φ. We first describe
all possible nonbasic fixed points of Φ.
Theorem 2. If P is a nonbasic fixed point of Φ, then either
P = (−1, . . . ,−1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1) (6)
or
P = (−1, . . . ,−1, pa, . . . , pl, 0, . . . , 0, pb, . . . , pm, 1, . . . , 1), (7)
where
− ε < pk < 0, k ∈ [a, l], (8)
0 < pk < ε, k ∈ [b,m], (9)
J(pk) = [a,m], k ∈ [a,m], (10)
and
pa + · · ·+ pm = 0. (11)
Proof. It is clear that if P is a nonbasic fixed point that does not have
form (6), then it has form (7) with pa, . . . , pl ∈ (−1, 0) and pb, . . . , pm ∈ (0, 1).
Inequalities (8) and (9) follow from Lemma 3.
Let us prove the remaining statements.
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Since pa < 0 and P is a fixed point, pa is influenced by positive pi and
it cannot be influenced by pi = 1. Hence, there exists an index r(a) ∈ [b,m]
such that either
J(pa) = [1, r(a)] (12)
or
J(pa) = [a, r(a)]. (13)
Note that these cases are different only if a > 1.
Since P is a fixed point,
− (a− 1) + pa + · · ·+ pr(a) = 0 (14)
in the first case and
pa + · · ·+ pr(a) = 0 (15)
in the second case.
It follows from (8) that any pk with k ∈ [a, l] is influenced by pa.
Thus, there exists an index r(a+ 1) ∈ [b,m] such that either
J(pa+1) = [1, r(a+ 1)] (16)
or
J(pa+1) = [a, r(a+ 1)]. (17)
We claim that
• if a > 1, then (12) implies (16);
• (13) implies (17);
• in both cases (16) and (17), r(a+ 1) = r(a).
To prove the first claim, we note that if a > 1 and (12) holds, then
pa + · · ·+ pr(a) = a− 1 > 0,
while if (17) holds, then
pa + · · ·+ pr(a) = 0 if r(a) = r(a+ 1)
and
pa + · · ·+ pr(a) = −pr(a)+1 − · · · − pr(a+1) < 0 if r(a) 6= r(a+ 1).
The second claim follows from the fact that if pa is not influenced by
pi = −1, then pa+1 ≥ pa cannot be influenced by pi = −1 as well.
To prove the third claim, we compare the equality
−(a− 1) + pa + · · ·+ pr(a) + pr(a+1) = 0
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with (14) in the first case and the equality
pa + · · ·+ pr(a) + pr(a+1) = 0
with (15) in the second case and note that pr(a+1) must be positive.
Continuing this process, we conclude that either J(pk) = [1, r(k)] for all
k ∈ [a, l] or J(pk) = [a, r(k)] for all k ∈ [a, l], and, in both cases,
r(a) = r(a+ 1) = · · · = r(l).
Clearly, this common value must be equal to m (since, otherwise, pm is
not influenced by negative pi, which is impossible for the fixed point P ).
In the second case, the equality r(a) = m implies (10), and equality (15)
implies (11).
To complete the proof of the theorem, it remains to show that if a > 1,
then the first case is impossible.
To do this, let us start with pm and “move in the opposite direction”:
find t(m) ∈ [a, l] such that J(pm) = [t(m), N ] or J(pm) = [t(m), m], and so
on.
Repeating the above reasoning, we get either the equality
pa + · · ·+ pm = m−N ≤ 0
or equality (11); both contradict the equality
pa + · · ·+ pm = a− 1 > 0
obtained above.
Now we are going to prove that if P is a nonbasic fixed point of Φ, then P
is unstable in a strong sense: P has a neighborhood U such that for any point
V ∈ U not belonging to a subset of U of positive codimension, the trajectory
Φn(V ) leaves U as n grows. The authors are grateful to A. Proskurnikov who
have noticed this fact and suggested the idea of the proof of the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. If P is a nonbasic fixed point of Φ having form (6) or (7),
then there exists a d > 0 such that if
U = {V : ρ(V, P ) < d},
and
Π = {V : va + · · ·+ vm = 0},
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then for any point V ∈ U \ Π there exists an n > 0 such that Φn(V ) /∈ U .
Proof. We impose several conditions on d.
First, it follows from (8) and (9) that we can take d so small that if V ∈ U ,
then
− ε < va ≤ · · · ≤ vm < ε. (18)
Second, condition (10) implies that if a 6= 1 (i.e., P has components equal
to −1), then pa is not influenced by these components (i.e., pa + 1 > ε).
Similarly, pm is not influenced by components +1 (if they exist). Hence, we
can take d so small that if V ∈ U , then
J(vk) ⊂ [a,m], k ∈ [a,m].
Finally, we take d so small that
h
N
(pm − d) > 2d and −
h
N
(pa + d) > 2d (19)
(recall that pm > 0 and pa < 0).
Denote
s(V ) = va + · · ·+ vm.
First we claim that if V ∈ U and
J(vm) 6= [a,m], (20)
then Φ(V ) /∈ U .
Assume that s(V ) ≥ 0. It follows from (18) and (20) that J(vm) = [k,m],
where k ≤ b (since vm is influenced by all positive components of V with
indices in [b,m]).
If wm(V ) ≥ 1, then v1m equals 1, and our claim follows from (18). Other-
wise,
v1m = wm(V ) = vm +
h
m− k + 1
(vk + · · ·+ vm).
Since
vk + · · ·+ vm = s(V )− (va + · · ·+ vk−1) ≥ −va
(we take into account that s(V ) ≥ 0 and va+1, . . . , vk−1 ≤ 0), it follows from
the inequalities m− k + 1 ≤ N , va < pa + d, and (19) that
v1m − vm ≥ −
h
m− k + 1
va > −
h
N
(pa + d) > 2d,
which is impossible if V ∈ U and Φ(V ) ∈ U .
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If s(V ) < 0, we apply a similar reasoning taking into account that relation
(20) implies the relation J(va) 6= [a,m].
Now let us take a point V ∈ U and assume that Φn(V ) ∈ U for all n > 0.
It follows from our previous reasoning that in this case,
J(vnk ) = [a,m], k ∈ [a,m],
for all n. Then, denoting s0 = S(v), we get the equalities
v1k = vk +
h
m− a+ 1
(va + · · ·+ vm) = vk +
hs0
m− a+ 1
, k ∈ [a,m],
which yields the equality
s(Φ(V )) = s0(1 + h).
Similarly,
s(Φ2(V )) = s(Φ(V ))(1 + h) = s0(1 + h)
2, . . . , s(Φn(V )) = s0(1 + h)
n,
and so on.
If V /∈ Π, then s0 6= 0, and the above value is unbounded as n → ∞,
which is impossible since the values S(V ) for V ∈ U are bounded.
This completes the proof.
Now we prove that if
ε ≤ 1/2, (21)
then trajectories of Φ tend to fixed points.
Theorem 4. If condition (21) is satisfied, then any trajectory Φn(V 0)
tends to a fixed point of Φ as n→∞.
Proof. Consider an initial sequence
V = (v1, . . . , vN).
Corollary 1 implies that if vnk = −1, then v
m
l = −1 for m ≥ n and l ≤ k;
similarly, if vnk = 1, then v
m
l = 1 for m ≥ n and l ≥ k.
Since the number of components of V n = Φn(V 0) is finite, we conclude
that there exist integers 0 ≤ a < b ≤ N and n1 ≥ 0 such that if n ≥ n1, then
V n = (−1, . . . ,−1, vna , . . . , v
n
b , 1, . . . , 1),
where
|vnk | < 1, k ∈ [a, b];
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in words, the number of components equal to ±1 “stabilizes.”
If the “middle” part (vn1a , . . . , v
n1
b ) is absent, Φ
n1(V ) is a fixed point, and
our statement is proved.
To simplify the notation, assume that n1 = 0. Clearly, our problem is to
describe the behavior of (vna , . . . , v
n
b ) as n grows.
It was shown in Lemma 3 that if |v0k| ≥ ε for some k ∈ [a, b], then |v
n
k | = 1
for large n, which is impossible. Hence,
− ε < vna ≤ · · · ≤ v
n
b < ε, n ≥ 0. (22)
These inequalities and condition (21) imply that
J(vnk ) ⊂ [a, b], k ∈ [a, b], n ≥ 0.
It follows that the behavior of (vna , . . . , v
n
b ) is determined by components
of V n with indices from a to b. Thus, without loss of generality, we may
assume that we study the behavior of V n with |vnk | < ε, 1 ≤ k ≤ N, n ≥ 0.
Let
N (V ) = {(k, l) ∈ [1, N ]× [1, N ] : |vk − vl| > ε}
be the set of pairs (k, l) of indices such that vk is not influenced by vl et vice
versa.
We prove the following simple but relevant statement separately.
Lemma 4.
N (V n) ⊂ N (V n+1), n ≥ 0. (23)
Proof. Inclusion (23) means that if |vnk − v
n
l | > ε, then
|vn+1k − v
n+1
l | > ε
as well.
Assume, for the sake of clarity, that vnk − v
n
l > ε (the symmetric case is
treated similarly). Then k > l, and if we write
wk(V
n) = vnk +∆k, wl(V
n) = vnl +∆l,
our statement follows from the inequality ∆k ≥ ∆l (see Lemma 2) and from
the equalities vn+1k = wk(V
n) and vn+1l = wl(V
n) (see inequalities (22)).
Thus, we get a nondecreasing sequence of subsets of [1, N ]× [1, N ]:
N (V 0) ⊂ N (V 1) ⊂ · · · ⊂ N (V n) ⊂ · · ·
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Since the set [1, N ]× [1, N ] is finite, there exists a n2 and a subset N (V )∗ of
[1, N ]× [1, N ] such that
N (V n) = N (V )∗, n ≥ n2.
We again assume that n2 = 0 and consider the set
M = [1, N ]× [1, N ] \ N (V )∗.
By construction, this set has the following property: for any n ≥ 0, vnk
and vnl influence each other if and only if
(k, l) ∈M.
Hence,
J(vnk ) = {l ∈ [1, N ] : (k, l) ∈M}, k ∈ [1, N ], n ≥ 0. (24)
Note that the set J(vnk ) does not depend on n; denote it J(k) and let I(k)
be the cardinality of J(k).
It is clear that, for any k ∈ [1, N ], the set J(k) has the form [k−µ(k), k+
ν(k)], where µ(k), ν(k) ≥ 0 and ν(k) + µ(k) + 1 = I(k).
Introduce an N ×N matrix T as follows: tk,l = 1/I(k) if (k, l) ∈M and
tk,l = 0 otherwise.
It follows from (24) that
Φ(V ) = (EN + hT )V,
where EN is the unit N ×N matrix.
Hence,
V n = (EN + hT )
nV 0, n ≥ 0. (25)
Let us show that the spectrum of the matrix T is real.
Represent T = SU , where S is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal
elements,
S = diag
(
1
I(1)
, . . . ,
1
I(N)
)
,
and entries uk,l of U are as follows: uk,l = 1 if (k, l) ∈ M and uk,l = 0
otherwise. Clearly, U is symmetric.
Then, T is conjugate to
S−1/2TS1/2 = S−1/2SUS1/2 = S1/2US1/2,
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but the last matrix is symmetric:
(S1/2US1/2)∗ = (S1/2)∗U∗(S1/2)∗ = S1/2US1/2.
Hence, the spectrum of T = SU (and so the spectrum of EN + hT ) is
real.
The kth row of the matrix T has the form(
0, . . . , 0,
1
I(k)
, . . . ,
1
I(k)
, 0, . . . , 0
)
,
where the number of nozero entries is precisely I(k).
This means that T is stochastic. A classical result states that T has an
eigenvalue 1 and all other eigenvalues λ satisfy the inequality |λ| ≤ 1.
Hence, the eigenvalues of T are real and belong to [−1, 1], which implies
that if h ∈ (0, 1), then the eigenvalues of EN + hT are positive.
In this case, any bounded sequence V n that satisfies (25) tends to a vector
W such that W = (EN + hT )W . To show this, consider a Jordan form J of
the matrix EN + hT :
J = diag(J1, . . . , Jl),
where J1, . . . , Jl are Jordan blocks.
Let us assume that J1 is a d × d block corresponding to an eigenvalue λ
and d > 1 (the case d = 1 is trivial), i.e.,
J1 =


λ 1 0 . . . 0
0 λ 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1
0 0 0 . . . λ


.
Let
(
k
j
)
be the binomial coefficients,
(
k
j
)
=
k!
j!(k − j)!
.
If k ≥ d− 1, then
Jkl =


λk kλk−1 k(k−1)
2
λk−2 . . .
(
k
d−1
)
λk−d+1
0 λk kλk−1 . . .
(
k
d−2
)
λk−d+2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . λk

 .
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Hence,
vk1 = λ
kv01 + kλ
k−1v02 + . . . ,
vk2 = λ
kv02 + . . . , . . . , v
k
d = λ
kv0d.
It follows that if the sequence V n is bounded and λ > 1, then v01 = · · · =
v0d = 0.
If λ = 1, then v02 = · · · = v
0
d = 0, and if we denote u = (v
0
1, 0, . . . , 0), then
Jn1 u = u for all n ≥ 0.
Finally, if λ < 1, then vn1 , . . . , v
n
d → 0 as n→∞.
Of course, similar statements hold for all Jordan blocks.
This implies that if the sequence V n is bounded, then we can represent V 0
in the form W1 +W2 such that (EN + hT )W1 = W1 and (EN + hT )
nW2 → 0
as n→∞. This completes the proof.
4. Numerical example
A numerical simulation shows that the final outcome of an election process
may change depending on the level of interaction of the society. This has the
interesting interpretation that a society is a complex entity which cannot be
reduced to the simple union of many individuals: beliefs in the society evolve
differently depending on the quality and level of mutual influence, which in
turn is highly dependent on technology and on the possible existence of rules
that limit the circulation of information.
In this example, we take N = 100, h = 0.1, and the initial profile of
opinions is as follows:
vk = −0.6, 0 ≤ k < 20;
vk = −0.4, 20 ≤ k < 48;
vk = −0.01, 48 ≤ k < 60;
vk = 0.1, 60 ≤ k < 90;
vk = 0.2, 90 ≤ k ≤ 100.
First we take ε = 0.45 (high level of interaction). Numerical simulation
shows that at step 27, a clustering equilibrium is reached, where opinion 1
achieves majority (at the equilibrium, vk = −1 for k = 1, . . . , 47 and vk = 1
for k = 48, . . . , 100).
After that, we take ε = 0.05 (low level of interaction) and the same initial
profile. At step 49, a clustering equilibrium is reached, where the opposite
16
opinion −1 achieves majority (at the equilibrium, vk = −1 for k = 1, . . . , 59
and vk = 1 for k = 60, . . . , 100).
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